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Asserson: Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld

WEINBERGER v. WIESENFELD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Gender-Based Classifications-Provision
of Social Security Act which provided less insuranceprotection
to females than to males denied equal protection of the law as
secured by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
Notwithstanding the old saw that "the road to hell is paved
with good intentions," beneficial purposes are often cited as justification for policies which discriminate on the basis of gender.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that such purposes
will suffice to defeat an equal protection challenge to legislative,
gender-based classifications.' In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,2 however, the Court indicated its unwillingness to blindly accept the
rationale of good intention.
In Wiesenfeld, the Court ruled that:3
Since the Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation
premised upon assumptions as to dependency made in the stat-

utes before us in Frontiero, the Constitution also forbids the
gender-based differentiation that results in the efforts of women
workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their families than is produced by the efforts of men.

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Brennan,4
thus held that the gender-based distinction under 42 U.S.C. §
402(g) of the Social Security Act which permitted widows but not
widowers to collect special benefits while caring for minor children, 5 violated the right to equal protection secured by the due
1. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). For a discussion of Kahn v. Shevin see note
23 supra and accompanying text.
2. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).

3. Id. at 645.
4. Justice Brennan expressed the view of five members of the Court. Justice Powell
filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined. Noting that he attached
less significance to the conclusions suggested by the legislative history of section 402(g)
than did the majority (see text accompanying notes 26.29, 51 supra), Justice Powell
asserted that the statute was unconstitutional because there was no legitimate governmental interest to support the classification at issue.
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate opinion, concurred in the result, noting that there
was no need for the Court to have gone so far as to state that the discrimination in the
challenged provision of the Social Security Act violated the fifth amendment as applied
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that it would
have been sufficient to base the decision on the ground that restricting these social security benefits to widows did not rationally serve any valid legislative purpose. Justice
Douglas did not participate in either the consideration or decision of the case.
5. The relevant portion of 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1974) provides:
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process clause of the fifth amendment.6
The Court affirmed on direct appeal7 the decision of a threejudge district court.' The district court held that section 402(g)
unjustifiably discriminated against women wage earners by affording them less protection for their survivors than is provided
to male wage earners.2 The district court stated: 10
During her employment as a teacher, maximum social security
payments were deducted from her salary. Yet, upon her tragic
death, her surviving spouse and child receive less social security
benefits than those of a male teacher who earned the same salary and made the same social security payments.
The appellee, Stephen Wiesenfeld, was married to a woman
who died in childbirth leaving him with the responsibility of caring for their infant son. Mr. Wiesenfeld's wife was a teacher whose
earnings were the couple's principal source of support during
their marriage. Maximum social security contributions were deMother's Insurance Benefits
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother ... of an individual who
died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced
mother -

(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits ... each of which
is less than three-fourths of the primary insurance amount of such
individual,
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or was entitled to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and selfemployment income of such individual for the month preceding the
month in which he died,
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of
such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit...
shall ...

be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit ....

(2) Such mother's insurance benefit for each month shall be equal to threefourths of the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual.
6. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not directly applicable to federal legislation such as Federal Old-Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance Benefits, but the concepts surrounding it have been incorporated
by the Supreme Court into the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1966).
8. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
9. Id. at 991.
10. Id. See generally Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit
Structure, 49 IND. L.J. 181 (1973).
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ducted from Mrs. Wiesenfeld's earnings during her working career." A short time after the death of his wife, the appellee applied
2
for Social Security Survivor's Benefits for himself and his son.
The Social Security office granted insurance benefits to the
child,' 3 but denied Mr. Wiesenfeld's application for benefits for
himself on the ground that such benefits were available only to
women under section 402(g).14
Mr. Wiesenfeld brought suit in February 1973, seeking a
judgment declaring section 402(g) unconstitutional and enjoining
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from denying
benefits under section 402(g) solely on the basis of the gender of
the applicant.'" The three-judge district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Mr. Wiesenfeld, and issued an order providing the relief sought.'6 From this decision, the defendant appealed

to the United States Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Government advanced two arguments in sup-

port of its claim that section 402(g) was constitutional. First, it
postulated that because benefits under the section are not compensation for work done, Congress was not obligated to provide
female contributors with the same coverage as is provided to
males.1 7 This argument was premised on Flemming v. Nestor,'"

where the Court held that social security benefits are "non-

contractual."' 9 The Government contended that the benefits an

individual receives do not actually compensate that person for
11. When Paula Wiesenfeld died on June 5, 1972, she was a "currently insured"
individual. See note 5 supra. She had "not less than six quarters of coverage during the
thirteen-quarter period ending with . ..the quarter in which [she] died." Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 n.3 (1975). See also 42 U.S.C. § 414(b) (1974). A "quarter
of coverage" means a three month period in which the individual has received at least
$50 in wages in covered employment or has received at least $100 of self-employed income.
42 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1974).
12. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 40131 (1974), are commonly referred to as Social Security Benefits.
13. Child's Insurance Benefits were obtained under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1974). Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 984-85 (D.N.J. 1973).
14. Appellee's affidavit stated that he was orally informed at the Social Security
office that he could not file for benefits in his own behalf. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of
HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 984-85 n.5 (D.N.J. 1973).
15. A woman without an income would be entitled to a grant equal in sum to the
amount received by an infant child. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(2), 402(g)(2) (1974); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 640-41 (1975).
16. The three-judge district court refused to allow the suit to be brought as a class
action. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 986-87 (D.N.J. 1973).
17. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 646 (1975).
18. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
19. Id. at 609-10.
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work performed, nor do such benefits correlate with contributions
made to the program in the form of withholding taxes. Thus, the
Government argued, an employee has "no right whatever to be
treated equally with other employees as regards the benefits
which flow from his or her employment."2 The Court rejected
this argument, noting that the "non-contractual" nature of social
based solely
security benefits could not justify the differential
2
upon the gender of the protected individual. '
The Government based its second argument upon the characterization of the classification at issue as one "designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who seek to support themselves
and their families.

2 2 It

was urged that the case should therefore

be controlled by the Court's prior decision in Kahn v. Shevin. 3
In Kahn, the Court upheld a state statute which conferred a tax
benefit on widows, but not widowers, on the ground that the
differentiation was reasonably designed to further the state policy
of ameliorating the greater hardship which women suffer upon
the death of a spouse. The Court in Kahn relied upon statistical
data to support its conclusion24 that men are still the primary
breadwinners of their families.

20. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 646 (1975).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 648.
23. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The Kahn Court distinguished Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes 33-35 infra), on the ground that
women could be treated differently from men in receiving certain statutory benefits, where
the statute is "reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial
impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy
burden." 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974). The Court upheld a Florida personal property tax
exemption of $500 that is granted to widows and not to widowers. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, noted that women could be treated differently than men because the
tax statute was designed to rectify past and present economic discrimination against
women. Id. at 355-56.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined in by Justice Marshall, adhered to the view that
gender-based classifications should be subject to the stricter equal protection test because
they are inherently suspect. Id. at 357-58. See note 43 infra. Justice Brennan asserted that
the Supreme Court is not:
[FIree to sustain the statute on the ground that it rationally promotes legitimate governmental interests; rather, such suspect classification can be sustained only when the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the challenged legislation serves . . . compelling interests that cannot be achieved either by a more carefully tailored legislative classification or by the use of feasible, less drastic means.
Id. at 357-58. See also note 43 infra.
24. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 354 n.7 (1974). But see F. LINDEN, WOMEN-A
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC PRESENTATION 22 (1973).
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Arguably, the statute considered in Wiesenfeld has
ameliorative consequences similar to the statute considered in
Kahn. Since women as a class suffer a greater financial hardship
upon the loss of a spouse, their need for assistance is greater. That
Congress has chosen to speak to these greater needs by insuring
the life of the husband does not realistically alter the situation.
The Wiesenfeld Court avoided this issue by discussing the statute
not in terms of its discrimination against male beneficiaries, but
rather in terms of its discrimination against insured females.
The Court departed from its analysis in Kahn by stating that
although there is some evidence to support the notion that men
are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their
families, such generalizations could not justify the gender-based
distinction made by section 402(g) .25Speaking for the majority,
Justice Brennan concluded that the appellee's wife was "deprived
of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which
benefits would be paid to others. 2' 6 This conclusion rested upon

the Court's interpretation of congressional intent as gleaned from
the legislative history of section 402(g).21 The Court determined
that the history of this section revealed a clear intent on the part
of Congress to allow women a choice of working or devoting their
29
time to the care of minor children." It was concluded that:
[The] distinction among women is explicable only because
Congress was not concerned in § 402(g) with the employment
problems of women generally but with the principle that children of covered employees are entitled to the personal attention
25. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). For a more extensive discussion on the role of working women in contemporary society, see F. LINDEN, supra note 24.
The author notes that:
Today there are approximately 20 million wives working outside the home
making substantial contributions to their families [sic] aggregate earnings.
This figure is about twice the amount as two decades ago. In fact, married
women have accounted for almost three quarters of the recent growth in the
female labor force.
Id. at 23. In 1971, 59 percent of women workers were married and one third of working
women had both a husband and dependent children. Randolph, Sex Discriminationin the
Family Benefits Sections of the Social SecurityAct, 8 CLFARINGHOUSE REV. 535 n.6 (1974).
26. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
27. Id. at 648-51.
28. Id. at 649. Section 402(g) benefits terminate when all the children of a beneficiary
are no longer eligible to receive children's benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1974). The
relevant portion of section 402(d) is set out at 420 U.S. 636, 639 n.5 (1975). Widows without
children cannot obtain benefits on the basis of their husband's earnings until the age of
60 (or, in cases of specified disability, age 50). 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) and (5) (1974).
29. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651 (1975).
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of the surviving parent if that parent chooses not to work.
. . . [T]he gender-based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely
irrational. The classification discriminates among surviving
children solely on the basis of the sex of the surviving parent.
Relying on Stanley v. Illinois,-° the Court emphasized that
Mr. Wiesenfeld had the right to elect to stay home with his infant
son and receive survivor's benefits. In Stanley, the Court stated
that the interests "of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection. ' 31 Similarly, the Wiesenfeld
2
Court noted its concern for the welfare of the appellee's son:
It is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than female.
And a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of [his children] ....
The Court concluded that Frontiero v. Richardson,33 not
Kahn, was controlling of the equal protection issue presented in
Wiesenfeld. In Frontiero, the Court declared unconstitutional
certain federal statutes which provided, solely for administrative
convenience, that spouses of male members of the armed services
are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarter allowances and medical benefits, but that spouses of female members
would not be treated as dependents unless they were, in fact,
dependent upon their wives for more than one half of their support. 4 The Wiesenfeld Court declared that section 402(g) functioned, as did the statutes invalidated in Frontiero, to "deprive
women of protection for their families which men receive as a
result of their employment."35 Justice Brennan observed that:3"
A virtually identical "archaic and overbroad" generalization,
"not . . . tolerated under the Constitution" underlies the dis30. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court in Stanley concluded that:
[A]lI Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness ....
It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him
while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal
Protection Clause.
Id. at 658.
31. Id. at 651.
32. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975).
33. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
34. Id. at 689 n.22.
35. 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
36. Id. at 643, citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
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tinction drawn by § 402(g), namely, that male workers' earnings
are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of
female wage-earners do not significantly contribute to their
families' support (citation omitted).

Under the traditional equal protection standard of review the rational (reasonable) relationship test - legislation will be
upheld when challenged unless the classification involved is patently arbitrary or bears no rational relationship to a legitimate
state or federal interest.3 7 Statutes subject to review under this
test bear a presumption of constitutionality; the requisite rational relationship will be assumed "even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are
otherwise silent," and their "classifications will be set aside only
if no grounds can be conceived to justify them."3
The three-judge district court 39 below concluded that section
402(g) satisfied the traditional rational basis test. 0 The court
held, however, that statutory classifications based upon gender
are inherently suspect, and therefore must be struck down unless
justified by a compelling governmental interest. Finding that
the classification at issue served no such interest, the district
court concluded that the disparate protection afforded by section
402(g) violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
The district court was constrained to rule on the question of
whether sex is a suspect basis of classification only because it
concluded that the Supreme Court had not sanctioned the resolution of equal protection cases except by the application of either
42
the traditional or the strict scrutiny test.
37. See, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 83 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 487 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
See also Developments in the Law- Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-87
(1969).
38. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
39. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
40. Id. at 990.
41. Id. See also United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975); Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971), where the courts
have also concluded that sex is indeed a "suspect" classification.
42. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973). The district
court rejected the suggestion that the Supreme Court had applied an intermediate equal
protection test in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court in Reed explained the
requirements imposed by the equal protection clause by quoting from the case of Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Reed v. Reed, supra at 76. The Wiesenfeld
district court concluded that Royster was not a "strong foundation" for a new equal
protection test because that case depended upon the traditional, rational basis standard
of review.
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43 the Supreme Court in
Prior to its decision in Frontiero,
4
Reed v. Reed had for the first time held unconstitutional a state
statute which treated women differently than men. The Court
declined the invitation by the appellant in Reed to hold that
statutory classifications based on gender are constitutionally suspect. The Court resolved the case by the application of a standard
more lenient than would have been applied had gender been declared suspect. The language of Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, however, appears to indicate that the Court went beyond the
rational basis test and instead applied an intermediate standard
of review.45

In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justices suggested that Reed did
in fact mark a "departure from [the] 'traditional' rational-basis analysis." 411 U.S. 677,
684 (1973). See also Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v.
Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972) (dictum); Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term - Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Model of
Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The FrontieroCourt was unable to
agree on what standard of review should be applied where the classification at issue is
based on gender.
A plurality of four Justices concluded that gender-based classifications are constitutionally suspect and therefore must be struck down unless they further a compelling
governmental interest. Expressing the view of this plurality, Justice Brennan explained
that:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
Id. at 686-87.
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, filed a concurring
opinion disagreeing with the plurality's characterization of sex as a suspect classification.
Justice Powell stated that based on the holding in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), there
were narrower grounds presented to find that the federal statutes at issue were unconstitutional. 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973). The opinion urged that the Court should abstain from
adopting the view that sex is a suspect classification while the Equal Rights Amendment
is in the process of ratification by the states. Id. at 692. See note 55 infra for the text of
the proposed 27th amendment.
Justice Stewart concurred separately in the judgment on the basis of Reed v. Reed,
supra. 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973). Justice Rehnquist dissented, indicating that he shared
with the district court the view that the classifications at issue were based on a rational
presumption of dependency.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have failed to resolve this issue. Courts continue to grapple with gender discrimination cases without clear guidance as to the applicable standards. See notes 41 and 42 supra.
44. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In this case, a provision of the Idaho Probate Code which gave
preference to men as administrators of decedents' estates was invalidated on the ground
that it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
45. See Gunther, supra note 42; Nowak, Realigning the Standardsof Review under
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Under this new, intermediate standard of review, a court
would be "less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising
its imagination."46 In his dissent in Dandridgev. Williams,47 Justice Marshall proposed that equal protection issues be decided by
balancing the following factors rather than by application of the
two-tier approach: (1) the character of the classification being
challenged; (2) the relative importance to persons in the class
discriminated against of the statutory benefits they do not receive; and (3) the asserted government interests in support of the
classification."8 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
embraced this approach, several cases decided by it appear to
apply the "sliding scale" approach advocated by Justice Marshall." Under this test, courts are"
required to focus on the actual rationality of the legislative
the Equal ProtectionGuarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and PermissiveClassifications, 62
GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974). The district court in Wiesenfeld-rejected this view of Reed. See note
42 supra.
46. Gunther, supra note 42, at 20-21. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1973); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins,
458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir. 1972); Samuels v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1974).
Some courts have, however, suggested that the so-called new intermediate test is only
a modification of the rational basis test. These courts indicate that the traditional test
has undergone a shift to a "slightly, but perceptibly more rigorous" standard of equal
protection review. See, e.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir.
1973); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Gedulig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
47. 397 U.S. 471 (1970)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 520-21. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall advocated that the use of
the two-tier equal protection standard of judicial review be abandoned in favor of a
"sliding scale" approach.
Justice White, in a concurring opinion, endorsed the analysis of Justice Marshall. He
commented that "it is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my Brother
Marshall has so ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing discriminations ... ' Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973), quoting in part San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 98-99.
49. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), where the Court appears to have
applied the intermediate test basing its decision in large part upon the idea of affirmative
action legislation, as well as the notion that the state has a valid interest in formulating
its own tax structure. The decision did not specifically identify which standard of review
it applied to the Florida statute. See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411
U.S. 619 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discussed in note 42 supra); Gunther, supra note
42, at 18-34.
50. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See also O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565, 578 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
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means under attack . . . [and to] apply the law to factual
contexts rather than accept one hypothetical legislative justification to the exclusion of others ....
The decision of the Supreme Court in Wiesenfeld should
resolve any remaining doubts as to whether the Court has indeed
abandoned a rigid two-tier approach to equal protection. The
majority stated that it was not willing to "accept at face value
assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted
purpose could not have been the goal of the legislation."5 1 The
decision in the instant case indicates the Court's unwillingness to
"rubber stamp" its approval of a federal benefit statute merely
because it purports to be in furtherance of some benign legislative
objective.
This approach is clearly inconsistent with an application of
the traditional test; the Court was not willing to speculate as to
whether Congress formulated section 402(g) in pursuit of the
amelioriative goals postulated by the Government's attorneys.
Rationality was not presumed where "source materials normally
resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action [were] otherwise silent." 52 Instead, the Court found its decision in Kahn
distinguishable because its review of the legislative history failed
to reveal an actual underlying compensatory purpose.
The decision in Wiesenfeld is perhaps the clearest application of the intermediate equal protection test by the Supreme
Court. That the Court refrained from explicitly adopting this
approach is regretable, given the confusion existing in the lower
courts. 53 Whether this test is to supersede the traditional approach or merely supplement it remains unclear.
54 decided shortly after Reed, JusIn Alexander v. Louisiana,
tice Douglas strongly stressed the need to reevaluate old presumptions about a woman's role in society, and to place a stricter
standard of review on gender-based classifications:"
51. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
52. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
53. See notes 42, 46 supra.
54. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
55. Id. at 639-41 (concurring opinion). Eleven years earlier, the Court concluded that
there was a rational basis for gender-based classifications and stated that "[women are]
still regarded as the center of home and family life." Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62
(1961)(upholding a law making it more difficult for women than men to be jurors). But
see Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975) (holding that the sixth amendment right to
trial by jury was denied by a statute automatically excluding women from jury panels).
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The absolute exemption provided by Louisiana . . . betrays a view of a woman's role which cannot withstand scrutiny
under modem standards.
Classifications based on sex are no longer insulated from
judicial scrutiny by a legislative judgment that "woman's place
is in the home," or that woman is by her "nature" ill-suited for
a particular task.

The mechanics of modernizing the judicial response to sex discrimination have yet to be clearly expressed. Pending the ratification of the proposed 27th amendment,5 6 or a clear resolution of the
issue of whether gender is a constitutionally suspect basis of classification, application of the flexible intermediate equal protection test will allow courts to hold statutes unconstitutional when
they operate to convert genetic happenstance into a legal disadvantage. 7 The Court's decision in Wiesenfeld offers clear support
for the application of this test.
Brian M. Asserson
56. Thirty-four of the requisite thirty-eight states have ratified the 27th amendment
to the Constitution. The amendment provides that:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
There are two exceptions that would not make sex a prohibited classification within
the meaning of the 27th amendment: first is the area of personal privacy, and second is
physical characteristics which are "unique" to only one gender. SENATE CoMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1972).
57. Since the decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), several
district courts have invalidated other provisions of the Social Security Act pertaining to
the one-half support requirements. See, e.g., Silbowitz v. Secretary of HEW, 44
U.S.L.W. 2030 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 1975); Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp.
308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), where the courts have held unconstitutional 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b),
(c)(1)(C), (e), and (f)(1)(D) (1974), which require a male to show at least one-half support
from his spouse before he is entitled to receive certain benefits.
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